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Abstract 
Helbing (2013:51) poignantly argues that ‘Globalization and technological revolutions are changing our planet’. Along with the 
benefits and opportunities associated with worldwide collaboration networks comes ‘pathways along which dangerous and 
damaging events can spread rapidly and globally’. With our hyper-connected world underpinned by hyper or hybrid-risks, the 
impact of unexpected events such as floods, earthquakes, financial crisis, and cyber-attacks has revealed the fragility and 
vulnerabilities that lie within the social/technological/economic/political/ecological interdependent systems. In particular, events 
that affect critical infrastructure such as damage to electric power, telecommunications, transportation, health care systems, 
financial markets and water-supply systems can have local, regional and global impact. Taleb (2007) calls these extreme events 
‘Black swans’ to describe their inherent quality of surprise. Many of the systemic risks that characterize Natural Hazard triggered 
Technological disasters (NATECH) often arise from unanticipated consequences of interactions within and between different 
types of systems. Johnson and Tivnan (2012:65) argue that, ‘…understanding, controlling and predicting extreme behavior [of 
NATECH] is an important strategic goal to support resilience planning’. In this light, a new paradigm is required to support 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) embedded in hyper-risks; one that will develop not only anticipatory measures for risk management 
but also prepare for the unpredictable and the ‘unknown’ by building organisational resilience for hyper-risks in general and 
NATECH disasters in particular. In this paper we explore the emergency management domain associated with the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear accident to show the hyper-connectivity and hyper-risks that permeated the problem space and thereby show how 
‘reflective responses’ underpinned by ‘critical reflective practices’ can be used to support resilience in such a complex disaster.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Network Mindset and hyper-risks 
Recent disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (2005), Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident (2011), Hurricane Sandy 
(2012), and Typhoon Haiyan (2013) highlight the vulnerability of communities to environmental and human-made 
disasters and the crippling effect that such disasters can have on the social and economic well-being of a nation. 
Such disasters have shown how such vulnerabilities reside in the complex interdependencies across different 
infrastructures (electric power, telecommunications, transportation, healthcare and water-supply systems) and the 
social costs that emerge from disruption of these interconnected systems. This is cogently explained by Vespignani 
(2010:984) when he said ‘relatively localized damage in one system may lead to failure in another, triggering a 
disruptive avalanche of cascading and escalating failures. Understanding the fragility induced by multiple 
interdependencies is one of the major challenges in the design of resilient infrastructures’. Such systemic failures 
emerge from the interconnectivity that characterizes the ‘network space’. Network thinking or more clearly a 
‘network mindset’ (Vespignani, 2009) is essential for understanding the network structure, network behavior and the 
feedback/feedforward effects resident within these systems. What emerges from the study of networks is the 
insightful requirement to evaluate actions and behaviours not in isolation but recognizing that cause and effect are 
complex and nonlinear (Masys, 2014). The ‘networked’ understanding of hyper-risks (Helbing, 2013) requires a 
more holistic approach to hazard identification and risk management that transcends the linear agent-consequence 
analysis. With events such as the 2010 Ash Cloud stemming from the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull and the resulting 
disruptions to air travel and trade in Europe (Harris et al, 2010), we see how ‘networked risks’ are not confined to 
national borders or a single sector, and do not fit the monocausal model of risk. As argued by Renn, Klinke and van 
Asselt (2011:234) such risks or hyper-risks are ‘...complex (multi-causal) and surrounded by uncertainty and/or 
ambiguity’. The risk landscape thereby calls for ‘reflective response’ one that is based on ‘critical reflective 
practices’ to support better understanding of interdependent systems and thereby contribute to enabling 
organizational resilience. A ‘resilient organization’ is understood as a ‘learning organization’ which does not 
unravel in ‘predictable’ and ‘unpredictable’ disasters. A resilient organization is realised only when the 
‘communities of practice’ are supported and nurtured as part of the overall goal of resilience. Such an organization 
will also be in a better position to respond and mitigate disaster risks both internally as well as externally for the ‘at 
risk’ community.  
 
Scope for hyper-risks in an inter-connected world: The case for NATECH  
 
United Nation’s International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (2009) defines ‘risk’ as ‘the 
combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences’. In the context of this paper this definition 
is extended to define hyper-risks as not only ‘an event’ but also processes that trigger an event or series of 
unpredictable events with a likelihood of trans-border cascading effect.  
 
Hyper-risks are hybrid because ‘a number of basic features that may have often been regarded as mutually 
exclusive’ (Beck, 2009) by the dominant risk, crisis and disaster theories are inclusive and fused. Hyper or hybrid-
risks are connected to several systems such as the society, environment, organization and the like (Helbing, 2013). 
In contrast, the dominant risk framework compartmentalises risks and hazards into three types: natural, social and 
technological (Jones and Hood, 1996; Beck, 1992). These are useful analytical distinctions. But in the context of 
hyper-risks they overlap and intersect to produce hybrid hazards known as quasi-natural hazards or NATECH 
hazards (Jones and Hood, 1996; David, et al., 2007). As a result, the conventional distinction between these three 
types of hazards has come under serious challenge from the disaster sociologists and geographers in light of recent 
disasters such as the Hurricane Katrina (David et al., 2007) and the Tohuku Earthquake. 
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A new paradigm is required to support DRR embedded in hyper-risks; one that will develop not only anticipatory 
measures for risk management; but also prepare for the unpredictable and the ‘unknown’ by building organizational 
resilience (Wildavsky, 1988; quoted in Jones and Hood, 1996; Taleb, 2007) for hyper-risks in general and NATECH 
disasters in particular. This merits the question, how can we build organizational resilience to comprehend hyper-
risks such as conjoined environmental and NATECH disasters. There are several ways to promote organizational 
resilience. This paper, proposes a ‘reflective response’ one that is based on ‘critical reflective practices’ and systems 
thinking. The discussion on reflective response is resumed after describing ‘what are NATECHs’ in the ensuing 
section.  
What are NATECHs?  
NATECHs occur at the seams of natural, environmental and technological hazards. It is the conjoint 
natural/technological disaster that makes the NATECH situation so different and complex (Cruz and Krausmann, 
2008) as it challenges risk management and risk governance. In this hyper-connected world, the NATECHs emerge 
as the reification of these hyper-risks. Although awareness of the need to better address NATECH risk has been on 
the rise (see Cruz, 2012), gaps remain across the board in terms of collective awareness as shown by the lack of 
NATECH risk governance internationally or organizationally.  The consequences of these conjoint events are much 
more substantial for communities than those posed by each hazard alone. This paper therefore moves from the 
traditional concept of crisis and disaster management to one of complexity management that can respond adequately 
to the conjoint NATECH disaster. What emerges from the analysis of the NATECH case studies/literature regarding 
gaps (see Steinberg, Sengul and Cruz, 2008; Cruz and Okada, 2008; Krausmann and Mushtaq, 2008; Krausmann 
and Cruz, 2013; Cruz, 2012; Ozunu et al., 2011) is how critical reflective practices can be harnessed to support 
preparedness and emergency planning through mindfulness in order to understand NATECHs and mitigate their 
consequences. 
1.2. The perspective of ‘reflective response’ in an inter-connected world 
In 2005, the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) urged the DRR community to shift from a reactive to 
proactive disaster response. In order to promote organizational resilience, against the odds of environmental and 
NATECH disasters, ‘reflective response’ is proposed. Reflective response is not a stand-alone response it is rather 
complementary to reactive and proactive disaster responses. At the outset, ‘reflective response’ is defined as a 
combination of individual, organized and critical reflections and reflective strategies embedded in an organization’s 
context.  
Individual reflection is self-reflective (Friere, 1972) and resonates with the concept of ‘sense making’ in 
organizations (Weick, 1995) that requires ‘interpretation’ (Weick, 1995:13). Interpretation is influenced by people’s 
belief and mental models.  According to Weick (1995:15), sense making has a ‘strong reflexive quality’ to the 
process of interpretation because ‘people make sense of things by seeing a world on which they already imposed 
what they believe’. In this dynamic and complex risk landscape reflective practices thereby can help to avoid 
overconfidence through a generative learning approach. Individual reflection is also being a ‘reflective practitioner’ 
(Schön, 1983) that involves: ‘on-the-spot surfacing, criticizing, restructuring, and testing of intuitive understanding 
of experienced phenomena; often it takes the form of a reflective conversation with the situation’ (Schön, 1983:241-
242).  More concretely, Schön (1983) made the distinction between ‘reflection-in-action’ and ‘reflection-on-action’, 
in order to reframe and solve some breakdown in the smooth running of experience (Plager, 1994; Schön, 1983). 
Reflection-in-action is based on a rapid interpretation of the situation, whereas ‘reflection-on-action’ occurs after the 
event to improve future action (Ghaye and Ghaye, 1998; Schön, 1983). Individual reflection is also about a balance 
between the right side of the brain (that is concerned with creativity, imagination, perception, intuition, synthesis, 
wonder and spirit) and the more dominant left side of the brain (that is concerned with qualities of the mind 
associated with analysis, reason, rationality and logic) (Johns, 2009). According to Johns reflection is then a 
balanced approach which requires a shift in thinking and new ways of responding.  
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On the other hand, organized reflection is ‘less about the individual reflective practitioner and more about 
organizing reflection’ (Reynolds and Vince, 2004:1) and in doing so, it takes account of ‘social and political 
processes at work in the organization of reflection’. This resonates with the comprehensive approach supporting 
complexity management in the defence, security and safety domains (Masys, 2014). Organizational theorists argued 
that ‘reflection’ did not fully capture the critical perspective of reflection in the context of organization and 
management studies (Antonacopoulou, 2004; Kayes, 2004; Nicolini et al., 2004; Reynolds and Vince, 2004; Welsh 
and Dehler, 2004). According to them reflection has to go beyond the individual to draw lessons from the power 
relations (Kemmis, 1985) within and between communities of practice in order to advance professions and 
management practices (Welsh and Dehler, 2004). The emphasis is then ‘placed […] on creating collective and 
organizationally focused processes for reflection’ (Reynolds and Vince, 2004:11). Organizing reflection is also 
linked closely to developing strategies for organizational development (see Antonacopoulou, 2004; Kayes, 2004; 
Nicolini et al., 2004; Reynolds and Vince, 2004; Welsh and Dehler, 2004).  
Lastly, ‘Critical thinking’ is analogous to critical reflection. ‘Critical thinking is a complex process of 
deliberation which involves wide range of skills and attitudes […] to think in critically analytical and evaluative 
ways [means] using mental process such as attention, categorisation, selection and judgement’ (Cottrell, 2005:1-2). 
The frameworks of ‘organizational learning’ and ‘learning organizations’ are central to critical reflection (Gould, 
2004). Organizational learning is learning that takes place at an organizational level and as a result gains new 
knowledge (Argyris and Schön, 1996; quoted in Fook, 2004). The framework of a ‘learning organization’, on the 
other hand, engages with systemic thinking, teamwork and work based learning of a practitioner/s within the wider 
organizational context (Senge, 1990; Gould, 2004). In a learning organization ‘people are continually discovering 
how they create their reality. And how they can change it’ (Senge, 1990: 13) being a part of the world rather than a 
separate entity.  
In light of the above, reflective response is then a ‘dynamic developmental process’ (Bolton, 2005:5) that occurs 
at the interface of individual, collective and critical levels that can be applied to support complexity management. It 
encompasses interrogating the assumptions integrated into the analysis along with reflecting on the ‘norms’ and 
‘appreciations’ which underpin judgments and actions (Reynolds and Vince, 2004). 
2. Case study: The triple disasters in Japan 
On 11 March 2011 Japan was hit by yet another devastating earthquake named the Great East Japan aka Tohoku. 
The Tohoku earthquake triggered a giant tsunami that reached the height of 40.5 meters in the city of Miyako and 
killed more than 15,844 people, and destroyed many businesses, livelihoods and homes. The tsunami also sparked 
nuclear accidents including the meltdown of three nuclear reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. 
The destruction of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant resulted in massive radioactive contamination of the 
Japanese mainland. As described in Wang et al (2013:127) `the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP has had 
significant impact on nearby communities due to radioactive contamination of land and groundwater, and long-term 
evacuation of people from their homes, farms, businesses and communities`. The hyper-risks associated with this 
NATECH resulted in radioactive caesium entering the ecosystem, and becoming ubiquitous, contaminating water, 
soil, plants and animals. It has been detected in a large range of Japanese foodstuffs, including spinach, tea leaves, 
milk, beef, and freshwater fish up to 200 miles from Fukushima (Starr, 2013). Estimates of the total economic loss 
range from US$250-$500 billion and the displacement of over 150,000 people. For the global nuclear industry, the 
accident has led to ‘regulatory changes that may slow or even eliminate plans for expansions of and investment in 
nuclear power in many countries’ (Cruz, 2012) thereby affecting the global energy market with geopolitical 
implications.  
3. Discussion 
A close scrutiny through the lens of reflective response reveals the caveat of the Fukushima case. Most 
importantly, the dominant reactive and pro-active disaster responses reveal their inadequacies to comprehend as well 
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as prepare for NATECH disasters. The DIET Report Executive summary (2013:9) argues that although the 
earthquake and tsunami of March 11 2011 are considered triggers of the cataclysmic event, `the subsequent accident 
at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly 
manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented’. In support of this, the analysis 
conducted by Krausmann and Cruz (2013:823) highlight ‘…model uncertainties reflected in insufficient design and 
low levels of preparedness, overconfidence in existing safety measures, cost/benefit considerations, complacency or 
the violation of safety regulations as key factors that contributed to the disaster`. The hyper-risks (hybrid risks) and 
the resident pathogens (Reason, 1997) rooted in a dysfunctional mindset that permeated the `network space` of the 
Fukushima case study highlights the necessity for a reflective analysis of the interdependencies and the potential for 
cascading effects described in (Helbing, 2013; Krausmann and Cruz, 2013:823).This mindset described in the 
Executive Summary of the Final Report- Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power 
Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (2012:32) reified as ‘...as a lack of a sense of urgency and imagination 
toward a major tsunami’. 
 
In terms of the accident, lack of imagination and urgency translate as a lack of foresight informed action. 
Fukushima nuclear accident can thereby be considered as `…not a natural disaster but clearly man-made` (DIET, 
2013:12).  The failure of imagination is a stark reminder of the findings of The 9/11 Commission Report (2004:336) 
that articulated ‘...a failure of imagination and a mindset that dismissed possibilities’ as a key underlying factor. The 
mindset that reified as a lack of imagination and inaction is rooted in the mental models regarded as incorporating 
ones biases, values, learning, experiences and beliefs about how the world works. In this way, such mental models 
reified as a mindset of organizational impediments to safety.  
 
As noted in the DIET (2013: 2) report, ‘the accident was the result of Tokyo Electric Power Company’s 
(TEPCO) failure in preparing against earthquakes and tsunamis, despite repeated warnings about the potential for 
such catastrophes. Although TEPCO had reviewed possible countermeasures for the kind of events that 
subsequently transpired, it postponed putting any measures into place for the other events, using the scientific 
improbability of such events as an excuse’. This mindset that failed to recognize and act upon warning and signals 
(vulnerabilities) highlight an ‘organizational impediment` likened to a `resident pathogen`(Reason, 1997) seeded 
years before that permeated the network space and shaped decision making at all levels. The prevalence of this 
organizational impediment is reflected in the DIET (2013:10) noting that the Fukushima Daiichi NPP was ` … 
incapable of withstanding an earthquake and tsunami. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) as the nuclear 
operator, the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) as the 
regulatory authorities, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), as the government body 
promoting nuclear power, all failed to correctly prepare and implement the most basic safety requirements, such as 
assessments of the probability of damage by earthquakes and tsunamis, countermeasures toward preparing for a 
severe accident caused by natural disasters, and safety measures for the public in case of a large release of 
radiation’. The primary purpose of existing laws and regulations was seen to be for the promotion of the use of 
nuclear energy and not for public safety and health (DIET, 2013:17). The values and beliefs of TEPCO, NSC and 
NISA characterized the hyper-risks (hybrid risks) in the form of organizational mindset that shaped decision 
making. In this sense, the hybrid risks created a complex network structure and behaviour that unravelled with the 
trigger of the tsunami resulting in a cascade-like event revealing the lack of preparation, insufficient vulnerability 
analysis and response. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007:2) highlight how such an event can be ‘...considered as an abrupt 
and brutal audit: at a moment’s notice, everything that was left unprepared becomes a complex problem, and every 
weakness comes rushing to the forefront’. 
 
Assumptions shaped the mindset that negated foresight and anticipation. DIET Report (2013: 44) revealed: 
‘Underlying NISA’s views was the conviction that, with regard to nuclear emergency preparedness, it was 
not necessary to anticipate an accident that would release enough radioactive material as to actually require 
protective actions, since (they believed) rigorous nuclear safety regulations, including safety inspections 
and operation management, were in place in Japan.  
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Contributing to the organizational impediments was the lack of organizational learning. As described in the 
DIET (2013:i3) ‘Japan has itself dealt with a number of nuclear power plant accidents, small and large. Most of 
these were responded to, but without sufficient transparency; sometimes they were concealed by the organizations 
concerned... while maintaining that accidents could not occur in Japan’. What was foreseeable was not actioned 
leaving Japan unprepared for this accident. This reluctance to embrace organizational learning is reflected in the ‘...
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) 3124*260+ The hyper-risks then 
interconnected the political, technological, social, ecological and economic domains. The organizational 
impediments rooted in a mindset that focused on promoting nuclear energy instead of health and safety reified as 
‘hardwired politics’ (Masys, 2010). Unreflective practices perpetuated this mindset. The unintended consequence 
was the erosion of preparedness and a dysfunctional mindset that dismissed possibilities.
 
3.1 Translating reflective responses into practise 
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industry in Japan required mindful exploration of disaster scenarios. Foresight and imagination that recognizes the 
inherent interdependencies in such a complex hyper-risk landscape support understanding of the vulnerabilities, 
triggers and consequences thereby influencing decision making. Reflective practice of scenario thinking can support 
the challenges of mental models. In the context of scenario planning, the major purposes of changing mental models 
can be seen as opening up perceptions, transitioning toward a learning organization, and as a result, decisions can 
encompass a wider range of thought (Chermack and Nimon, 2013:819). 
 
Reflective practice at the organizational level then allows members to ‘…critically evaluate their own thinking, 
but also, to investigate the shared, collective assumptions and expectations, as well as the institutionalized rules and 
routines’ (Hilden and  Tikkamaki, 2013). Within the context of DRR and NATECH, this provides a methodology to 
address many of the gaps identified regarding the hyper-risks. Reflective practices that support mindfulness affords 
organizations involved in DRR within the context of NATECH a ‘heightened awareness in critical and complex 
situations which require novel responses’ (Zundel, 2012). As described in Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), mindfulness 
(as a an offshoot of reflective practice) supports a preoccupation with failure and a reluctance to simplify 
interpretations, coupled with sensitivity to weak signals and the ability to respond locally and in real time.  In this 
sense, reflection is about engaging in analysis, considering alternatives, seeing things from various perspectives to 
better understand the NATECH hyper-risks and potentially cascading effects. As noted from the Fukushima case 
study and the studies on NATECH accidents conducted by Cruz (2012) and Krausmann and Cruz (2013), the 
requirement to test and challenge assumptions, theories and ideas emerges as a key enabler to support DRR. 
 
The increasing complexity of today’s interconnected and interdependent systems as it pertains to DRR has 
resulted in calls for greater understanding and development mechanisms for coping with uncertainty and shocks to 
the system. Strategic reflection creates an opportunity to share, compare and explore mental models thus opening up 
consideration of the variety of possibilities. Enabling resilience therefore requires a constant sense of unease that 
prevents complacency, as argued by Hollnagel and Woods (2006). In supporting resilience, the ability to learn and 
change requires the application of double-loop learning. This learning is rooted in an organizations ability to frame 
and then reframe, or to change the way in which they think about or view a concept or idea (Senge, 1990). 
Chermack and Nimon (2013:816) argue that ‘most critical is the ability to change ones’ mental model in order to 
778   Anthony J. Masys et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  18 ( 2014 )  772 – 779 
view the future of an organization through a new lens. Such reflective practice requires dialogue and conversation 
about strategic issues decision makers are facing (Chermack, 2011; Georgantzas and Acar, 1995; Schwartz, 1991; 
van der Heijden, 1997, 2005; Wack, 1985a)’, a reflective capacity that was not apparent in the Fukushima case 
study.  
4. Conclusion 
The root cause of the accident was human-made stemming from interconnected hyper-risks characterized as a 
mental model that focused on benefits to the nuclear industry over health and safety and resulted in a mindset that 
lacked imagination and action. They minimized the possibility of accidents to the point of denying it, and in doing 
so they lost their humility in the face of reality. To tackle such hyper-risks, which has such global impact, this paper 
has argued for developing organizational resilience by adopting ‘reflective response’. Reflective response is 
understood as a combination of individual, collective and critical reflections and reflective strategies to build the 
capacity of learning organizations.  Building organizational resilience is seminal in this hyper-connected world 
whereby the social, technological, political, ecological and economic domains are entangled. The case study also 
demonstrated the importance of adopting non-linear, complex mental models in order to prepare for the NATECH 
disasters embedded in hyper-risks. Currently, the dominant risk, crisis and disaster theories and practices are 
inadequate to offer a space to comprehend the true nature of hyper-risks and NATECH disasters.  
 
Reflective practices such as systems thinking and scenario planning increases the richness of thinking and 
facilitates insightful dialogues that challenge the linear mindset. Such reflective practice can be used to investigate 
the peripheral, the weak signals, to explore the possibility space of the risk landscape thereby establishing a focus on 
evolving goals and strategic priorities of stakeholders and how these support resilience.  It is well documented in the 
literature that NATECH awareness and preparedness levels both by the industry and authorities is low. Therefore, 
existing preparedness and response plans need to be improved to explicitly include the aspect of possible hazardous-
materials releases, fires and/or explosions due to natural hazards to reduce the NATECH risk (Krausmann and Cruz, 
2013:823). The reflective practice of foresight and scenario planning helps to uncover the complexities associated 
with hyper-risks by exploring the space of possibilities through critical reflection and imagination. 
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